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Postcommunist Capitalism and Democracy: Cutting the Postcommunist Cake
1
 
 
The postcommunist world is of interest for several reasons. First, it covers a 
substantial part of the world’s surface and of its population, even if one excludes 
China.  Second, we are always told that the reason why the social sciences have an 
inferiority complex in relation to the natural sciences is that we are inferior, as in the 
psychiatrist’s joke, and that this is in large part because we can’t rely on experiments. 
Thus the forty-year or, in the Soviet case, seventy-year experiment with communism, 
followed by the twenty-year experience of postcommunist ‚transition’, can hardly fail 
to interest us.  For anyone, like myself or readers of this journal, with an interest in the 
prospects for democratic socialism, the experience of undemocratic socialism, or 
whatever one calls the societies ruled by monopolistic communist parties in the 
twentieth century, is surely relevant. Finally, the re-establishment of capitalism and 
the establishment or re-restablishment of democracy (where this has occurred) might 
have implications for our understanding of these institutions and their interrelations.  
    The continuing relevance of the terms postcommunist or postsocialist may 
require some justification.  We no longer speak of post-fascist Italy or post-Nazi 
Germany except perhaps to refer to the immediate postwar years, and some people 
have argued that it is time to pension off ‚postcommunism’ as well. I shall suggest 
here that this would be a mistake, both because the legacies of communism can be 
shown to persist and because the parts of Europe which experienced communism 
continue to be subject to differential dynamics in the development of Europe since 
                                                 
1
 Earlier versions of this article were presented to a work-in-progress seminar at 
Newcastle and to the International Consortium of Social Theory Programs  
conference at Sussex in summer 2010, and to a Citizenship in South-East Europe 
(CITSEE) seminar at Edinburgh in December 2010.   
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1989.
2
  (The sharpest expression of this is captured in Iván Berend’s description of 
Eastern and Central Europe’s ‚Detour from the Periphery to the Periphery’ (Berend, 
1996), and the development of Europe, and of the European Union in particular, has 
done little to defuse the provocative phrase.)   
By ‚cutting the postcommunist cake’ I am referring to the way in which parts 
of the postcommunist world are differentiated in academic analysis and public 
discussion.
3
   
The first cut is that just mentioned, between the postcommunist world and the rest of, 
here, Europe and Eurasia.  As everyone recognizes, though, the postcommunist world, 
or even postcommunist Europe and the former Soviet Union, do not form a 
homogeneous entity.
4
  There is less agreement however on where the most important 
dividing lines are to be drawn.  Here is a list of some of them: 
1) Even a basic regional division, such as the tripartite one used by the EBRD, 
between Central Europe (including Slovenia) and the Baltic States (CEB), South-
Eastern Europe (SEE) and Commonwealth of Independent States and Mongolia 
                                                 
2
 See Stenning and Hörschelmann (2008); also the volume discussed below, edited by 
David Lane and Martin Myant, in which ‘The contributors were asked to consider 
how far the societies in transition from state socialism carry a common footprint from 
their communist pasts…’ (Lane and Myant, 2007: 1).  
3
 The pejorative use of the adjective ‘Balkan’ both inside and outside the region 
would be one example. There are of course echoes in my analysis of what is called 
‘constructivism’ in International Relations, though I shall not pursue these 
connections here. See also Klaus Eder, (2006) ‘Europe’s Borders: The Narrative 
Construction of the Boundaries of Europe’, European Journal of Social Theory, 9, 2, 
May, pp. 255-271. 
4
 As Joseph Rothschild wrote of the difference between western historians in the 
1950s and those more recently, ‘To our predecessors and teachers, the Stalinist 
imposition of monopolistic communist rule appeared - quite understandably – to be a 
profoundly revolutionary rupture with earlier patterns, traditions, and histories. 
Today, we are more impressed with the survival and resurgence of poitical 
continuities from the interwar period in such dimensions as the styles and degrees of 
political participation, the operational codes and cultures of political elites, the 
process of recruiting new political elites, their definitions of economic priorities, and 
so forth. (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000: 223)   
 3 
(CIS+M) is loaded with political and economic baggage, such as EU membership 
discussed below.
5
   
2) The simplest and most arbitrary division, though of course politically 
consequential, is that between the states which are currently or are about to become 
members of the EU and those which are not. Although the location of the dividing 
line at a given moment may be contingent, however, there is a good deal of interest in 
following the processes by which potential members such as postcommunist Slovakia 
in the 1990s, become acceptable, salonfähig, or remain excluded. 
3) Thinking still of institutional membership, there is an important difference in the 
postcommunist world between eastern Germany and the rest. The GDR, in the form 
of its newly created five states, was wholly absorbed into the Federal Republic. This 
had an upside (massive transfers of resources) and a downside (the virtual destruction 
of the East German economy).
6
 Three other questions of national boundaries might be 
mentioned here.  The early and relatively painless secession of Slovenia after its ‘ten 
day war’) reinforced the special economic position which it had always occupied 
within Yugoslavia and was reflected in its accession to the European Union in 2004.  
The break-up of the Soviet Union created a line between regions remaining within 
Russia (including the Kaliningrad area as an exclave) and the republics which became 
independent, including of course the Baltic states now in the EU. Thirdly, the velvet 
divorce between the Czech and Slovak Republics made the former appear somewhat 
                                                 
5
 See Jon Elster et al, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies, CUP 1996. 
pp. 46-7: ‘In the literature an “invisible map” drawing a distinction between East 
Central and South East Europe plays a prominent part…[but]…this distinction with 
its familiar discriminatory connotations is a rather shaky basis for comparative 
research on East European transitions.’ The authors recall in a footnote that they were 
rebuked by Czechs and Hungarians for also including Bulgaria in their four-country 
study.  
6
 For a comparative discussion, see Offe (1995). 
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more attractive as an accession candidate and the latter much less so, even before the 
Mečiar dictatorship ruled it out.  
4) A more informal membership pertains to what has become known as the Visegrád 
group, established at Havel’s instigation at a meeting in Bratislava between 
Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary and foreshadowed by trans-border contacts 
between dissidents (Havel, 2008: 154-6). As Havel notes, it served as an example to 
other postcommunist states; its members formed the core of the 2004 EU enlargement 
- as well as the main focus of academic studies of postcommunism. 
5) Havel and others in the Visegrád group were of course conscious of the historical 
links between its three, later four members. Another historical legacy which has 
served some commentators as an important dividing-line is the Habsburg Empire, 
which included Slovenia and Croatia in the west, Transylvania in the east and parts of 
modern Poland and Ukraine.  Others point more to the line between ‘Western’ 
Christianity and Greek and Russian Orthodoxy or to that between predominantly 
Christian and Muslim parts of Europe: orthogonal to the Western/Orthodox line is the 
boundary of the Ottoman Empire, separating the south from the north of Eastern 
Europe.  Even the internal ‘Western’ division between Catholic and Protestant has 
played a part in post-1989 politics – for example in Czechoslovakia or on the 
German-German border between protestant Hesse in the west and Catholic Eichsfeld 
in the east (Berdahl, 1999). To these long-standing historical divisions one should add 
the economic one from the eighteenth and nineteenth and separating regions like 
Bohemia, plugged into Western European circuits, from the ‘rest of the east’,  
providing essentially raw materials and agricultural products (Stokes, 1997: 21-2).
7
  
                                                 
7
 These differences tend not to show up in comparative value surveys, such as that by 
Miller, White and Heywood (1998), which found little difference on socialist, 
nationalist, liberal and democratic values, except that what they call ‘external 
 5 
6) Then there is the division between pacted or negotiated and revolutionary 
transitions, which arguably separates Poland and Hungary from Czechoslovakia, with 
Germany, as always, a special case.
8
  This division in turn may be argued to reflect an 
earlier difference between what Kitschelt et al (1999: 23-6) call ‘national-
accommodative’ and ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian’ communism.  All communist 
regimes were of course bureaucratic and authoritarian, but in Poland and Hungary, 
and also in Slovenia and Croatia (and possibly the rest of Yugoslavia), these features 
were moderated by elements of compromise with local social groups or civil society 
organisations (independent peasants and the Catholic Church in Poland, small-scale 
private enterprise and intellectuals in both Poland and Hungary, as well as the 
Yugoslav republics). Kitschelt et al. (2009: 23) distinguish a third variant, 
‘patrimonial communism’, which ‘relies on vertical chains of personal dependence 
between leaders in the state and party apparatus and their entourage, buttressed by 
extensive patronage and clientelist networks’. This type is represented in their study 
by Bulgaria but also includes Romania, Albania and the rest of Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union.  Without going into the details of this analysis, one can see that 
differences of this kind cannot but affect the type of transition and its outcome.
9
  In 
Romania, Bulgaria and Albania, the diagnosis and dating of transition itself becomes 
contentious, shading off into the later obscurities of the break-up of Yugoslavia and of 
the Soviet Union and the colour revolutions which continue sporadically to the 
present (Lane, 2009).  Whether these should be seen as aftershocks of 1989, clearing 
                                                                                                                                            
nationalism’ or support for power politics was stronger in the formerly imperial states 
(Russia and Hungary) than in the Czech or Slovak Republics or Ukraine.   
8
 An early comparative analysis which remains useful is that by Judy Batt (1991). 
More recently, a Bulgarian commentator, Boyko Vasiliev (2010) has provided an 
ironical gloss on these differentiations.   
9
 eg the early development in Hungary of a multiparty system  
 6 
up unfinished business, or whether, conversely, 1989 should be seen as exceptional, is 
the question at the back of my reflections here.
10
  
I am concerned here however with a slightly more specific question: whether 
there is something distinctive about the forms of capitalism and democracy which 
have developed in postcommunist Europe and what account we should take of them 
in rethinking the relation between capitalism and democracy. At the back of these 
reflections lie essentially two themes. First, the diversity of forms of capitalism 
discussed explicitly by the ‚Varieties of Capitalism’ literature.11  To the ‚Varieties of 
Capitalism’ literature one should add the more oblique but complementary treatment 
of these issues in world-system theory, globalisation theory and Marxist political 
economy and the more Foucauldian theries of governmentality (Brenner, Peck and 
Theodore, 2010).
12
 In relation to democracy, I have been inspired particularly by the 
excellent recent book on Multiple Democracies by Paul Blokker (2010: 1)‚ and by the 
paradox he notes, that ‚while 1989 is generally regarded as the „hour of 
democracy“...the imagination of democracy seems to have been hardly affected by the 
events and their consequences.’13  
   * * * 
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 In a suggestive comparison of Poland and Romania, Alina Mingiu-Pippidi (2005: 
234) suggests that in postcommunist democracies ‘…the main indicator of…success 
became the distance between the formal institutions adopted – which were the same 
everywhere – and the informal practices in politics and society…The greater the 
difference between the past and the present formal institutions, the larger the distance 
between current formal and informal institutions’. She concludes (p. 235) that 
‘…there is an “unbearable lightness” to democracy: Only after you have it do you 
realise how many other things are needed for a government to be able to provide 
quality of life to its citizens’.   
11
 For a critical application of this approach to postcommunist varieties, the 
fundamental contribution is the book edited by David Lane and Martin Myant (2007). 
See also, more recently, the excellent overviews by Dorothee Bohle and Béla 
Greskovits (2009a) and Katharina Bluhm and Vera Trappmann (2010).  
12
 For an extremely interesting application of the last of these, see Aihwa Ong (2006).  
13
 See also Auer (2010). 
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It can of course be argued that there is nothing in these diversities to be 
explained by the postcommunist condition or by the geography of eastern or central 
Europe.  1989 was, or turned out to be, essentially a triple return to ‚Europe’, 
democracy and capitalism. Everyone had had enough of qualifying adjectives for 
democracy such as the pleonastic ‚people’s democracy’ (‚mensonge par pléonasme’, 
as Raymond Aron aptly described it. It seemed inappropriate to go on speaking of 
eastern Europe now the curtain was down, and even central raised uncomfortable 
memories and seemed to drive a wedge through the Visegrád cluster or what were to 
become the 2004 accession states. Capitalism had not been at the top of the menu in 
1989, even where the idea of markets had been, but it rapidly became a fait accompli.  
Vaclav Klaus brushed aside the ‚social market economy’, saying he preferred to drop 
the adjective.  And yet it would be odd if nearly forty years of state socialism (and 
nearly seventy in the former USSR) had not left important traces.  Even where 
Western forms were adopted wholesale, it rmains the case, as Claus Offe (1996: 216) 
pointed out, that ‚no Western political, social or economic institution has been 
invented for the purpose of extricating an entire group of societies from the conditions 
of state socialism and its ruins.’ (my emphasis)   
To begin, I should rapidly mention two paths not taken.
14
 The first is that of a 
‚third way’ between capitalism and state socialism; the second that of a new type of 
democracy reflecting and building on the civil society activism of the 1980s.  There 
are three prime sites in which an observer in late 1989 or early 1990 might have 
looked for signs of a third way.  One is Germany, where it seemed for a time that 
there was the option of a confederation of the two German states and, at least for the 
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 A third is the neutralisation of the postcommunist region as opposed to its 
polarisation between EU/NATO and Russia (Sarotte, 2009; for the economic 
dimension see Lane, 2007: 462).  
 8 
East, an intermediate economic path. We know how quickly that was overtaken by 
events: the slogan ‚We are one people’, whether or not it began as an appeal to the 
East German security forces not to shoot their fellow citizens, rapidly became a 
demand for reunification under Kohl’s ample wings. A second candidate is Poland, 
where the transformation had after all been driven by what stated off as a trade union.  
Here too, however, the incoming Solidarity government rapidly initiated capitalist 
shock therapy and called on what remained of the union to bring the working class 
into line with the new course. Finally, Hungary, like Poland but more substantially 
and over a longer period, had aready gone some distance towards a form of market 
socialism of a Yugoslav kind.  
Was socialist self-management without communist monopoly rule (which had 
already gone in Hungary by the summer of 1989) a possibility?  No-one much seemed 
to think so, and local analyses probably parallelled that of Nigel Swain (1992: 31-2): 
‚The reintroduction of capitalist economic relations in Hungary...was probably 
inevitable’.  In Hungary and Yugoslavia, as in Germany, a bird in the hand (Western 
capitalism) looked a better prospect than a pig in a poke. (Kornai, 1992)  
As for democracy, a striking feature of dissident activity in the 1980s had been 
an approach which Konrád called anti-political. Havel’s ‚living in truth’ and the 
practice of operating openly as if under conditions of freedom was also far removed 
from the instrumentalism of conventional politics. The eclipse of civil society 
movements and of the broad anticommunist alliances which had been such a feature 
of 1989 was as rapid, by western standards, as had been their rise. In part this was 
intended. As Havel (2008: 78) put it, ‚...the Civic Forum was a body created for a 
single purpose: to peacefully push aside the previous regime and mediate the 
transition to democracy.  It was meant to exist for a couple of weeks and then dissolve 
 9 
into normal political parties.’ There was disappointment both inside and outside the 
region at the rapid disappearance of innovative momenents and their replacement by 
something like a ‚Western’ party system, distinguished only by its volatility and the 
understandable intensity of political antagonisms rooted in the old regime.  The 
process was however inevitable.
15
  
In any case, it must be remembered that what was meant by democracy was 
primarily social and political freedom rather than a particular set of political 
arrangements.  Constitutions had to be rewritten – more in some countries than others 
- but many institutions remained in their previous form, freed of the communist 
content which had denatured them.  As Havel (2007: 72) wrote in his memoir 
interviews: 
 
There was not a lot that was specifically communistic in what you call the 
‘technology of power’ once the leading role of the Communist Party no longer 
applied, and things were no longer decided first in the Politburo.  The 
government simply meets on certain days; there’s an agenda, there are 
procedural rules, the ministers have to receive their briefing materials in time, 
and so on… 
 
There could be no question of just ‘dismantling’ the existing structures. Instead, ‘We 
tried to fill existing posts with new, uncompromised people and then, by democratic 
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 The weakness of civil society, in the sense of associational life, remains a striking 
feature of the postcommunist world. As Marc Morjé Howard (2003: 13-14) notes, 
‘Although the breakdown or survival of democracy may not be at stake, the quality of 
post-communist democracy suffers as a result of the weakness of civil society, as 
post-communist citizens become increasingly alienated from the political process, 
while simultaneously lacking the institutional leverage that organizations might 
provide.’  
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means – that is, by passing constitutional and ordinary laws - to carry out the systemic 
changes we were able to agree on as the most necessary and the most important.’ 
(Havel 2007: 69-70).   
 
The US historian of the Balkans Gale Stokes, in a short article of 1993 entitled 
‘Is it Possible to Be Optimistic about Eastern Europe’ concluded that, with the 
exception of Albania and former Yugoslavia (apart from Slovenia): 
 
Eastern Europe is not in transition.  To one degree or another, every East 
European political system is already pluralist.  What we are seeing now is 
what we are going to get in the future – bitter political struggles, nasty 
elections, corruption, and fights over the media.  This is what it means to have 
a normal political life…Each of these countries in its own way has committed 
itself to the pluralist adventure and has embarked on it.  If we compare this 
commitment and the progress made in what is, historically speaking, a very 
short time with the situation these societies faced in 1983, or 1953, or 1933, is 
it not possible to be at least a little bit optimistic about Eastern Europe? 
(Stokes, 1997: 202-3) 
   * * * 
What then is distinctive about postcommunist capitalism and postcommunist 
democracy, and do they have lessons for those of us living further west? Both 
transitions were both easier and more difficult than expected.  The German case is 
particularly striking.  Chancellor Kohl’s ‘10-point programme’ with which he startled 
the Bundestag on November 28
th
, 1989, envisaged a gradual approach to unity via a 
‘treaty community’ (Vertragsgemeinschaft).  Just over 10 months later, unification 
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was complete. In between these two dates, on July 1
st
, 1990, the President of the 
Bundesbank congratulated himself on the smoothness of the GDR’s switch to the D-
Mark.  Looking at the wave-like motion of federal election statistics, the only sign of 
unification (apart from a larger electorate) is the appearance of two new minority 
parties: the PDS and Bündnis 90.  The devil was of course in the detail: monetary 
union decimated the East German economy, and the ‘rush to unification’ (Jarausch, 
1994) left many East Germans feeling the victims of an Anschluss or a colonial 
takeover (Christ and Neubauer, 1991).  This is one of the issues on which there 
remains a really significant difference of opinion between East and West Germans: 
the former agreeing two to one that East Germany was ‘overwhelmed and taken over 
by West Germany in the process of unification’, while in the West the proportions are 
almost inversed (59% to 38%) (Pew, 2009: 47).    
The German situation was particularly extreme, despite massive transfers from 
West to east, because of Kohl’s encouragement of unrealistic expectations (‘blooming 
landscapes’) on the one hand and the shock of monetary union on the other. The 
whole region, however, experienced a ‘transition shock’ which was partly inevitable 
and partly due to the excesses of neoliberalism.  Ernest Gellner described the pre-
industrial European state in terms of dentistry, operating by means of ‘extraction’, but 
the metaphor fits even better the strategy adopted in postcommunist transitions, whose 
protagonists argued that ‘of course, if you haven’t been to the dentist for forty or, in 
the worst case, seventy years, the necessary treatment will be extensive and 
expensive’. To shift the image from one orifice to another, postcommunist capitalism 
had a difficult birth, as the appalling waste of the communist planned economies was 
followed by a similar waste of economic and human resources in often chaotic and ill-
conceived (and often criminal) privatisations .   
 12 
And yet, somehow or other, there emerged in the more favoured parts of the 
bloc, and the more favoured sectors, something recognizably like Western capitalist 
economies, showing the same sort of variation between neoliberal and more 
corporatist styles of economic governance that can be found in the West.
16
 It is time to 
ask whether Berend’s image of the detour of Eastern Europe from the periphery to the 
periphery is too pessimistic.  One Škoda doesn’t make a summer, but the prospect of a 
gradual catch-up, at least for parts of the former bloc and for favoured sectors in them, 
began to seem realistic.   
   * * * 
Do postcommunist Europeans (many of whom are also of course 
postcommunist in the sense that they were born after the end of communism) like 
their capitalism and their democracy?  The bad news for anticapitalist democrats
17
 is 
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 An important alternative approach which deserves fuller treatment is that by 
Andreas Nölke and Arjan Vliegenhart (2009), following the approach of Bohle and 
Greskovits. They argue that East Central Europe, and a fortiori other postcommunist 
states, should be assigned to a third category of ‘dependent market economies’, 
dependent on foreign investment, ownership and export markets. This leaves them in 
a subordinate position in the world economy but one which has enabled substantial 
relative progress. The Baltic states, by contrast, with their more neoliberal approach, 
‘might still be caught in a “postsocialist developmental trap” that hinders structural 
economic development.’ (pp. 692-3). Greskovits (2010: 10) also argues for a ‘triadic’ 
model consisting of ‘ a neoliberal type in the Baltic states, an embedded neoliberal 
type in the Visegrád states, and a neocorporatist type in Slovenia’. (Bulgaria and 
Romania, he adds, have also tended towards neoliberalism.) As for their structural 
location, he assigns the Visegrád states and Slovenia to a ‘semi-core’ and the others to 
a ‘semiperiphery’ (pp. 5-6). Lucian Cernat (2006: 18), following David Lane and 
others, also offers a third category of ‘developmental capitalism’, where ‘state and 
business collaborate positively’. He suggests (p. 29): ‘There is at present a lack of 
consensus as to whether the processes of institution building in post-socialist Europe 
reflect the development of a well-defined European capitalist model or contribute to 
the creation of a “cocktail capitalism”.’  These debates will of course continue on a 
country, regional and sectoral basis (see, for example, Crouch, Schröder and 
Voelzkow 2009). What is crucial in all this, I think, is to attend to both dimensions: 
domestic variation as analysed in the Variety of Capitalism literature, and global 
position.    
17
 In the circles in which I am lucky enough to move, everyone is (as far as I know) a 
convinced democrat, while there is much more mixed attitude to capitalism. For a 
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that there is generally much stronger support for the market economy than for 
actually-existing democracy.  The Pew (2009) survey asked respondents in eight 
postcommunist countries (plus East Germany) whether they agreed that ‘Most people 
are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and some 
are poor’.   Support for markets was higher in Poland (70%) than in West Germany 
(65%), Britain (67%), France (61%) and Spain (59%). These Western figures are 
comparable with those in much of the East (63% in the Czech Republic, 56% in 
Slovakia, 52% in Russia and 50% in Lithuania.  Opinion in Ukraine was evenly 
balanced, with 46% agreeing and 43% disagreeing, and only in Bulgaria and, 
interestingly, Hungary, was there majority disagreement (58% in Bulgaria and 65% in 
Hungary) (Pew, 2009: 41).  This compares strikingly with support for democracy.  In 
all the postcommunist countries surveyed except Ukraine there was a majority in 
favour of the change to multiparty democracy, but with a range from 85% in East 
Germany and 80% in the Czech Republic to figures in the fifties in Hungary, 
Lithuania, Russia and Bulgaria, which all recorded substantial declines since 1991 
(Pew, 2009: 1).
18
 Most dramatically, perhaps, a 2009 poll found a majority of East 
Germans saying that life in the GDR had ‘more good sides than bad sides’ and 8% 
saying it was better than in the reunified Germany. 
A recent Polish survey cited by Stefan Garsztecki (2010: 9), though less up-
beat about Polish opinion, strikingly illustrates the anomalous state of that in 
Hungary. Asked whether democratisation since 1989 should be considered ‘a success 
or a defeat’, Poles, Czechs and Slovaks recorded more or less clear majorities for 
                                                                                                                                            
brilliant short analysis of the latter, see Colin Crouch (2010) and, for more 
background, Crouch (2009). 
18
 Sometimes the relation is the other way round. Bohle (2011) cites the 1997 
Eurobarometer figures for Hungary and Latvia: the market economy seemed ‘right’ to 
no Latvians and only 6% of Hungarians, while democracy satisfied 30% in Hungary 
and 24% in Latvia.   
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‘success’, whereas two thirds of Hungarians opted for ‘defeat’.  On the other hand, 
when asked how important it was to them to live in a democratically ruled country, 
only half of Poles found it ‘very important’, as compared to over three quarters in 
Germany, France and Britain (Garsztecki, 2010: 12). The figures for Ukraine and 
Russia were 36% and 16% respectively, though with a clear majority in both countries 
when those replying ‘rather important’ are added.   
Figures like these raise once again the question of a line of division between 
the former Soviet Union (perhaps excluding the Baltic states) and Eastern and central 
Europe.  The best survey evidence is probably that provided by Richard Rose and his 
associates, who have run for nearly twenty years the New Europe Barometer and New 
Russia Barometer series.  Rose (2009) concludes that this is significant.  Although 
one of his comparative tables, in which respondents were asked where they would like 
their political system to be, on a scale from dictatorship to democracy, and where they 
put it at present, does not show striking differences between the former Soviet states 
of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus and the new EU states (Rose, 2009: 165), he points 
out that ‘in new EU member states an average of 57 per cent say that democracy is 
always preferable; in Russia only 25 per cent are so strongly committed to 
democracy’ (Rose, 2009: 188). And although there is no significant difference in 
opinion on these issues between Russia and central Asian states such as Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan, or between Russian Orthodox and Muslims in those states, ‘the 
divergence of institutional development between CEE [Central and Eastern Europe] 
and post-Soviet countries means that both Russians and Muslims have learned to 
adapt to very different types of political regimes’ (Rose, 2009: 190).  
In all the postcommunist countries except East Germany, where opinion was 
evenly divided, there was majority support in the Pew survey for the view that a 
 15 
strong economy is more important than a good democracy, with figures in the fifties 
in Poland and the Czech and Slovak Republics and in the mid-seventies in the others 
(Pew, 2009: 25). Satisfaction with the current working of democracy showed a similar 
pattern: massively negative except in the same three countries, with a substantial 
positive majority only in Poland (Pew, 2009: 32).
19
 A recent issue of the Journal of 
Democracy records ‘Deepening Dissatisfaction’ (Krastev, 2010) and the need for ‘a 
New Model’ (Rupnik, 2010).  A Freedom House report describes 2008 as 
‘Democracy’s Dark Year’ (Shkolnikov, 2009: title) and the Central European 
University in Budapest has a ‘Center for the Study of Imperfections in Democracy’. 
Germany is a good place to look for comparative data.  A survey in 2000 
asked whether the social market economy ‘had proved itself’ (sich bewährt). Two 
thirds overall said it had, but with a third of eastern and a quarter of western 
respondents disagreeing. Asked whether its future development should tend to more 
market and free competition or to more social security, around half chose the latter as 
against a quarter for the former.  Eastern opinion was much more emphatic: 67% to 
20% (Bürklin and Jung, 2001: 691-2). More recently, the Pew survey of 2009 shows 
rather more Eastern than Western Germans (39% as against 31%) disagreeing with 
the suggestion that ‘Most people are better off in a free market economy, even though 
some people are rich and some are poor’; the East German figure is however equal to 
that in France (40%), while support for markets is higher in Poland than in West 
Germany (Pew, 2009: 41). 
Survey evidence suggests a majority perception in east central Europe that 
there are ‘strong’ or ‘very strong’ conflicts between managers and workers and that 
                                                 
19
 Andrew Roberts (2010) uses objective rather than subjective indicators of 
‘accountability’ and ‘responsiveness’, including detailed case studies of policy areas 
(pensions and housing) in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary.  
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income differentials are ‘too great’, and a relation between the perception of conflict 
and objective inequality as measured by Gini coefficient (Delhey, 2001: 203-5).  Post-
communist electorates remain more egalitarian in their attitudes than Western 
Europeans, to a degree more closely related than in the West to the actual levels of 
inequality in their societies (Delhey, 2001). As Paul Blokker (2009: 174) notes, 
‘Contrary to exaggerated claims of a prevalent neo-liberal discourse in the region, 
discourses oriented by a clear ethic of distributive justice or social solidarity have 
been present in all three societies [Poland, Hungary and Romania RWO] throughout 
democratization.’ 
 The traditional expression of egalitarian attitudes, in Europe and to some 
extent elsewhere, has been social democratic politics, but the scissor effect in the 
post-communist countries of the local demise of socialist/communist political and 
economic policies and the general reorientation of social democracy into third way or 
‘new’ politics has tended to restrict this development. Instead, we find a more 
inchoate ‘politics of anger’ (Ost, 2005), rather like that of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ extreme 
right in Western Europe, the former arguably represented by the BNP, FN, 
Republikaner etc. and the latter by Jörg Haider and Pim Fortuyn and their successors 
(Guibernau, 2010).
20
   
 Poised between the old West and the old East, Germany is an interesting case. 
Although the SPD experienced in 2009 its worst result since the establishment of the 
Federal Republic, the combined support for SPD, Greens and the Left Party is 
currently running at just over 50%. The Left Party, formed out of the old East German 
PDS (ex-SED) and a small West German grouping, got nearly 12% in 2009 and is 
currently on 8%, better than the long-established FDP. Its support is overwhelmingly 
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 I should say that this is my distinction rather than Guibernau’s, though she also 
addresses these differences of political style. 
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in East Germany (and the eastern districts of Berlin), but it has become a serious 
player in an increasingly volatile pattern of national and local politics. (Just before the 
Federal elections of 2009, only a quarter of voters described themselves as determined 
to vote for a particular party (Jung, 2009b; see also Jung, 2009a).)  The dilemma for 
the SPD, as for other social democratic parties, is whether to adopt a sharper political 
profile at the risk of abandoning the centre to the parties of the Right (Jung, 2011).   
Overall, the effects of social structure on political preferences are not, or not 
yet, particularly significant in postcommunist Europe.  As Szelényi and his colleagues 
(Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley, 1997: 212) suggested, ideological issues tend to 
predominate in the earlier period of transition, with class issues tending to emerge 
only some time later.  Mateju et al (2005: 233-4) identify a similar shift from political 
attitudes polarised between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, or people perceiving themselves as 
such, to a more objectively determined interest-based politics.  
 
In the early periods of the transformation, the role of subjective factors 
(subjective mobility, relative deprivation, perception of change in life-chances, 
and so on) in the determination of voting behaviour is likely to be stronger 
than the role of objective class.  As the new post-socialist class structure 
emerges and the politics of symbols is transformed into the politics of 
interests, however, objective class is becoming a more and more important 
factor in voting behaviour.       
 
 18 
As this example shows, economics and politics, or capitalism and democracy, 
are even more closely interdependent in the postcommunist context than elsewhere,
21
 
and I turn in conclusion to the analysis of postcommunist democracy.  Once again, it 
was both the best of times and the worst of times.  On the plus side, one has to note 
the surprisingly rapid emergence of something like western party structures and party 
competition – albeit at the expense of the more informal social movements which had 
helped to undermine or overthrow the communist regimes and had initially seemed 
well placed to succeed them.  On the other hand, the party competition has been 
exceptionally volatile and often violent, harking back to the Leninist dictum that 
politics is about who screws whom (кто кого). In the case of Poland, the polarization 
has led one sociologist to suggest a more formal separation between the enlightened-
western PO-land and catholic-nationalist PiS-land.
22
 Corruption has been endemic, 
not just in the ‘wild east’ but also in the west of the region, and even leaving aside the 
appalling civil war in former Yugoslavia and the dictatorships of Mečiar and 
Lukashenka (and others further east), the antics of the Kaczynskis or (in a rather 
different way) of Klaus are not encouraging. The current situation in Hungary is also 
extremely depressing, not just for democratic socialism but for democracy as a whole, 
with an extreme right party out-polling the socialists and the governing party 
introducing restrictions on media freedom. 
Once again, it is not clear whether these should be seen as infantile maladies 
of postcommunism or something more entrenched and more similar to what has been 
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 Gil Eyal (2000) has pointed to an underlying elective affinity between Czech 
political dissidence and neoliberal monetarism, focussed particularly on a shared 
commitment to the truthful representation of political and economic affairs. 
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 See Jacek Żakowski, ‘POland and PiSland’, Polityka 2010-11-19; PaD (Polityka 
auf Deutsch) 87, referring to and extending the argument of an article by Radisław 
Markowski. See also Greskovits (2010) on the polarisation between neoliberal and 
antiliberal-nationalist politics. Also Bale (2003).  
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called postdemocracy. And this is of course a problem for Europe as a whole, since a 
united Europe now exists in a more or less complete form in the European Union, 
even if its quantitative or extensive growth has not been matched by qualitative or 
intensive growing together.  Looking on the bright side, whereas a lot of people 
(including me – Outhwaite 2009) have worried about the ways in which democracy 
might threaten capitalism or, more seriously, capitalism might threaten democracy, 
there seems to be a clear affinity between them in the postcommunist region, with 
economic reform and democratization going together like a horse and carriage.
23
 On 
the other hand, new democracies are inevitably less robust than older ones and, as 
Rupnik (2010: 106) points out, ‘…it is clear that democracy can no longer derive its 
legitimacy from 1989…’ 
What I suggest in conclusion, obviously enough, is that we should be 
concerned about the vulnerability of democratic politics in both East and West,
24
 but 
without falling into the temptation of double standards and stereotypical 
condemnation of the East or, for that matter, the South.
25
 The ‘digested read’ of this 
paper might be the truism that postcommunist capitalisms and democracies will be 
pretty much like others, except where they are different. The important point is to be 
able to judge where the differences are insurmountable and where they are not (See 
Bunce et al, 2010; also Mungiu-Pippidi, 2010). The lessons of 1989 and the EU 
enlargements of 2004 and 2007 suggest some modest degree of optimism.  But as the 
late Fred Halliday (2010:16) pointed out, 
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 Frye (2010) argues that both autocracies and excessively polarized democratic 
systems are inimical to economic reform.   
24
 On Western Europe see, for example, Mair 2006. 
25
 As Monica Ciobanu (2009) argues, it is important that models such as ‘quality of 
democracy’ be used flexibly and with attention to local institutional contexts.  
 20 
Communism was not just a utopian project, it was a dramatic response to the 
inequalities and conflicts generated by capitalist modernity; the continuation 
of some of these same inequalities and conflicts today suggests that further 
challenges…will result.   
 
Communism may be dead; the challenge to democratic socialism remains, in both 
East and West. 
 21 
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